


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**ANTI-  
FEDERALIST  
PAPERS**



*Edited by  
Ralph Ketcham*

**AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL  
CONVENTION DEBATES**

ANTI-FEDERALIST PAPERS  
AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION DEBATES

# *The Clashes and Compromises That Gave Birth to Our Government*

**T**he *Federalist Papers* defended the Constitution and its strong central government. *The Anti-Federalist Papers* represented the dissenting opinions of such statesmen as Patrick Henry and Melancton Smith, who saw threats in the Constitution to the rights and liberties so recently won from England. Although the Anti-Federalists lost, they came close to winning, and their opinions represent an important contribution to the American political tradition.

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## THE RIGHTS OF THE INDIVIDUAL VERSUS THE POWER OF THE GOVERNMENT

Should the members of the government be elected by direct vote of the people? Should the central government of the United States be stronger than the individual state governments? Does slavery have any place in a nation dedicated to liberty? Should the government be headed by a single executive, and how powerful should that executive be? Should immigrants be allowed into the United States? Which citizens should have the vote? How should judges be appointed, and what should their role in government be? What human rights should be safe from government infringement? In 1787, these important questions and others were raised as the states debated the merits of the proposed Constitution. Along with *The Federalist Papers*, this invaluable book documents the political context in which the Constitution was born.

---

**Ralph Ketcham** is Professor of History and Political Science at the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs of Syracuse University. He is the author of many books on American History, including *Presidents Above Party: The First American Presidency*; *From Colony to Country: The Revolution in American Thought, 1750–1820*; and *James Madison: A Biography*.

THE  
ANTI-FEDERALIST PAPERS  
AND  
THE CONSTITUTIONAL  
CONVENTION DEBATES

---

EDITED AND WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY

Ralph Ketcham



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# Contents

INTRODUCTION .....	ix
<i>The Revolutionary Background of     American Constitutional Thought</i> .....	ix
<i>Republicanism in the 1780s</i> .....	xiv
<i>Political Currents of the 1780s</i> .....	xvii
<i>The Federal Convention of 1787</i> .....	xx
<i>The Ratification Contest</i> .....	xxii
<i>Federalist Principles</i> .....	xxv
<i>Anti-federalist Political Thought</i> .....	xxvi
ARRANGEMENT, USE, AND EDITING OF THE DOCUMENTS .....	xxxii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS .....	xxxiv
LIST OF PLANS, PROPOSALS, AND AMENDMENTS .....	xxxv
CHRONOLOGY OF DOCUMENTS AND IMPORTANT EVENTS.....	xxxvi
SUMMARY OF OPPOSED ARGUMENTS IN FEDERALIST AND ANTI-FEDERALIST WRITINGS.....	xxxix

## PART I THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

James Madison to George Washington (April 16, 1787).....	3
The Virginia Plan (May 29) (Edmund Randolph) .....	7
Debate on Representation (May 31) (Roger Sherman, Elbridge Gerry, George Mason, James Wilson, James Madison).....	13
Debate on Executive Power (June 1) (Wilson, John Rutledge, Sherman, Gerry, Randolph) .....	15
Opposition to Executive Salaries (June 2) (Benjamin Franklin) .....	17



Opposition to a Unitary Executive (June 4) (Mason).....	21
Electing Representatives (June 6) (Gerry, Wilson, Sherman, Mason, Madison, John Dickinson).....	24
Debate on Method of Electing Senators (June 7) (Sherman, Charles Pinckney, Dickinson, Wilson, George Read, Madison, Gerry).....	29
Debate on Veto of State Laws (June 8) (Pinckney, Madison, Hugh Williamson, Gerry, Sherman, Wilson, Dickinson, Gunning Bedford, Pierce Butler).....	34
The New Jersey Plan (June 15) (William Paterson).....	39
Debate on the New Jersey Plan (June 16) (Paterson, Wilson, Randolph).....	42
Plan for National Government (June 18) (Alexander Hamilton).....	48
Opposition to the New Jersey Plan (June 19) (Madison).....	58
Debate on Federalism (June 21) (William S. Johnson, Wilson, Madison).....	66
Length of Term in Office for Senators (June 26) (Madison, Sherman, Read, Hamilton).....	70
Debate on State Equality in the Senate (June 28–July 2) (Madison, Johnson, Oliver Ellsworth, Wilson, Rufus King, Hamilton, Bedford, Gouverneur Morris).....	74
Majority Rule, the Basic Republican Principle (July 5, 13, 14) (Madison, Wilson).....	93
Election and Term of Office of the National Executive (July 17, 19) (Morris, Sherman, Wilson, Pinckney, Mason, Madison, Gerry).....	98
The Judiciary, the Veto, and Separation of Powers (July 21) (Wilson, Nathaniel Gorham, Ellsworth, Madison, Mason, Gerry, Caleb Strong, Morris, Luther Martin).....	106
Appointment of Judges (July 21) (Madison, Pinckney, Randolph, Ellsworth, Morris, Gerry, Mason).....	111

Method of Ratification (July 23) (Mason, Ellsworth, Madison) .....	114
Election of the Executive (July 24, 25) (Gerry, Strong, Williamson, Ellsworth, Wilson, Madison) .....	117
First Draft of the Constitution (August 6) (Committee on Detail; Rutledge, Chairman) .....	122
Qualifications for Suffrage (August 7, 10) (Wilson, Morris, Ellsworth, Mason, Madison, Franklin, John F. Mercer, Rutledge, Pinckney) .....	135
Citizenship for Immigrants (August 9) (Morris, Ellsworth, Pinckney, Mason, Madison, Butler, Franklin, Randolph, Wilson) .....	148
Executive Veto Power (August 15) (Morris, Sherman, Wilson) .....	152
Slavery and the Constitution (August 21, 22) (Martin, Rutledge, Ellsworth, Pinckney, Sherman, Mason, Charles C. Pinckney, Abraham Baldwin, Wilson, Gerry, Dickinson, Williamson, King, John Langdon) .....	153
Election and Powers of the President (September 4, 5, 6) (Morris, Mason, Butler, Pinckney, Williamson, Baldwin, Wilson, Randolph, George Clymer, Hamilton) .....	159
Opposition to the Constitution (September 7, 10, 15) (Mason, Randolph, Gerry) .....	166
Signing the Constitution (September 17) (Franklin, Gorham, George Washington, Randolph, Morris, Williamson, Hamilton, William Blount, Gerry) .....	172

## PART II RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION

Speech of James Wilson (October 6, 1787) .....	181
THE NEED FOR ENERGY IN GOVERNMENT (Explained in Federalist Numbers 1-8, 15-32, 34-36, 73-77) .....	188



"John DeWitt," Essays I and II (October 22 and 27, 1787) .....	188
Speeches of Patrick Henry (June 5 and 7, 1788) .....	199
Amendments Proposed by the Anti-federalists (February 7 and June 27, 1788) .....	220
Amendments to the Constitution (June 27, 1788) .....	226
Amendments Proposed by the Rhode Island Convention (March 6, 1790) .....	229
PREVENTING TYRANNY UNDER THE NEW CONSTITUTION (Explained in Federalist Numbers 9-14, 33, 37-51, 78-85) .....	231
"Centinel," Number I (October 5, 1787) .....	232
Address of the Pennsylvania Minority (December 18, 1787)....	243
Letters from the Federal Farmer, I and II (October 8 and 9, 1787) .....	266
"Brutus," Essays I, VI, X-XII, and XV (October 18 and December 27, 1787; January 24 and 31, February 7, and March 20, 1788) .....	281
THE MEANING OF GOVERNMENT BY CONSENT (Explained in Federalist Numbers 57-72) .....	328
"John DeWitt," Essay III (November 5, 1787) .....	329
"Cato," Letters V and VII (November 22, 1787; January 3, 1788) .....	336
"Brutus," Essays IV and XVI (November 29, 1787; April 10, 1788) .....	345
Speeches of Melancton Smith (June 20-27, 1788) .....	358
APPENDIX I: The Articles of Confederation 1777 (1781) .....	383
APPENDIX II: The Constitution of the United States of America .....	393
APPENDIX III: Principal Speakers at the Federal Convention of 1787 .....	418
ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY .....	420
INDEX OF IDEAS .....	425

# Introduction

## *The Revolutionary Background of American Constitutional Thought*

For anyone interested in political thought in action, the United States during the 1770s and 1780s is perhaps the most exciting period in the country's history. The discussion of political ideas that accompanied the American Revolution was seminal to the effort in 1787–1788 to draft and ratify a new constitution for the United States. In the years before 1776, as tension increased between Great Britain and her North American dominions, the rapidly maturing colonies were a laboratory of proposals and revised forms of union and confederated government. Each colony was more or less self-governing under its own "constitution," but officials on both sides of the Atlantic probed for a more satisfactory relationship between the colonies and the mother country. The eleven years between the Stamp Act Crisis (1765) and the Declaration of Independence (1776) were years of vigorous, creative political thinking which produced hundreds of pamphlets, newspaper articles, and other writings on questions of representative government and confederation. Writers in Great Britain, too, debated basic political principles and regarded the many proposals for governing the empire as part of the quest for freer, eventually more democratic government.

Political independence, moreover, required new modes of thinking not only about the government but also about national identity. Initially, Britons in America often felt a sharp sense of loss in their repudiation of loyalty to the mother country. Gone or discredited were important parts of the body politic and their undergirding ideas. Revolutionists challenged the House of Lords, military institutions and traditions, and even the monarch



himself—symbol and embodiment of the nation. Colonials who still thought of England as “home” regretted, too, the distancing from a cherished land and culture; Salisbury Plain and London, Shakespeare and Milton, the ale house and the parish church remained deep in the consciousness—or subconsciousness—of many transatlantic Britons. Americans were uneasy about giving up this national identity and hence moved slowly and reluctantly toward independence. Many remained “loyalists” because they could not countenance such traumatic loss. Yet, by 1776, the “radical change in the principles, opinions, sentiments, and affections [that] was the real American Revolution,” as John Adams put it, had taken place: Americans no longer thought of themselves as members of the British body politic; they were no longer part of what they, and most enlightened European opinion, often regarded as the freest, best-governed nation in the world.

New institutions and new ideas of government were needed, then, to replace the rejected British models. Yet, as the revolutionary tracts showed, and as the debate over the new constitution would demonstrate anew, Americans had very little beyond British ideology and experience with which to fashion a new nationhood. All the best-known writers—Harrington, Locke, Hutcheson, Algernon Sidney, Swift, Trenchard and Gordon, Price, Burgh, and even the works of Voltaire and Montesquieu idealizing British government—focused American attention on English history and thought. Within this thoroughly British pattern, however, American political thinkers began to express vital differences in emphasis. Traditional, Tory ideas had much less weight in America than they had in Britain. Ancient institutions such as the Church, the nobility, and the common law weakened in the New World. The palaces and fortresses of authority could not cross the Atlantic Ocean. On the other hand, “radical Whig” thought, emphasizing openness and freedom, loomed proportionately larger in America. A century and one half of physical separation and relatively isolated development had nurtured what in many ways were distinctive societies. As political leaders sought after 1776 to move from colony to country, they used British concepts and precedents, but they also fashioned anew

for a new nation in a New World. To an initial revolution in loyalty which repudiated a nationality, Americans had to add a second revolution in purpose that would form ideas and institutions for a new polity.

Between 1776 and 1787, then, Americans undertook to create a new republic. They had to articulate and establish, perhaps beginning with revised understandings of human nature itself, basic principles and institutions of free government. Following the lead of Tom Paine in *Common Sense* (1776), many dreamed that the overthrow of oppressive, irrational customs and authority might be followed by a paradisiacal age when only the mildest and simplest bonds of self-government would be necessary. A western Massachusetts town resolved in 1776 that "what is the fundamental Constitution of this province, what are the undeniable Rights of the people, the powers of the Rulers, how often to be elected by the people, etc." were matters to be determined explicitly and anew by the people. Though John Adams believed Paine's ideas a "Star of Disaster," and warned that it was "safest to proceed in all established modes to which the people have been familiarized by habit," he still saw in Independence "Rays of Ravishing Light and Glory." Americans would create, as they announced on their great seal, *novus ordo seclorum*, "a new order of the ages." The new government to be fashioned in the United States might become a model for the world.

Beginning with New Hampshire in January 1776, every state drafted at least one constitution before 1787 (Connecticut and Rhode Island, without royal governors before 1776, merely had to remove references to Great Britain from colonial charters). Thus the new states added to the theoretical debates of the Revolutionary era a considerable practical experience in drafting and inaugurating new, constitutional governments. They tried many often novel proposals for legislative, executive, and judicial departments. By 1787, in a famous calculation by Thomas Jefferson, the new states had had eleven times thirteen, or nearly 150, years of experience in republican government. On the whole Jefferson thought the experiments remarkably successful, proving that the people were capable of governing themselves.

Mindful of the oppressions of their last British governors,



most states established legislative supremacy based on the principle of consent in their new constitutions. Pennsylvania gave broad powers to an annually-elected single-house (unicameral) legislature. In Virginia and other states, the legislature elected the governor and often had the power to appoint judges and other officials. In some states, though, notably New York and Massachusetts, the executive had more power and was elected directly by the qualified voters. Maryland chose the upper house by means of an elector college similar to that eventually put into the federal constitution. Bills of rights were drafted and debated in every state. Writing and ratifying the Articles of Confederation led to further discussion of principles and forms of government. By 1787, not only had the theory of self-government been widely debated, but virtually every conceivable device for implementing it had been suggested, if not tried.

As had been true during the long debate over "representation" within the British Empire before 1776, much attention focused on giving voice to the undistorted and uncorrupted will of the people. Small districts, annual elections, rotation in office, versions of referendum and recall, and unicameral legislatures were among the devices tried to tie representatives to that will. Intense rivalries, clash of interests, and manipulation of voters and representatives, though, seemed often to lead legislative governments into biased and unwise measures. Many states with two-house (bicameral) legislatures, and some with frankly aristocratic upper houses, even found that prolonged deliberation and checks on popular will could result in more dispassionate and practical legislation. By 1787 Americans had tried many devices of representative government, and had discussed at length the more sophisticated dilemmas it posed.

The liabilities of executive weakness had by 1787 also become apparent. Jefferson and Madison considered the impotent governorship of Virginia "the worst part of a bad constitution." The governor, elected by the legislature and required to act only with the consent of a council also elected by the legislature, was simply unable to govern. The elections of the governor and council became occasions for intrigue and influence-swapping of the worst sort. As experience with elective rather than he-

hereditary or appointed executives accumulated, furthermore, a new and intriguing possibility emerged: the elective governor might himself become a legitimate part of government by consent when he vetoed laws, made appointments, or commanded the militia. Thus election of the governor by the people was a potentially effective *extension* of popular influence, rather than a checking of it as had normally been the case under a monarchical executive. As James Wilson would put it in 1790, with executives elected by the people and thus drawn from the same source as legislatures, "they who execute and they who administer the laws, are as much the servants, and therefore as much the friends of the people, as those who make them."

The judiciary also came under reconsideration. Experiments with legislative appointment of judges, or even election by the people, undertaken on democratic principles, seemed often to subject judges to political pressures that hindered impartiality and "equal justice." A few years' experience in Virginia with legislature-appointed judges had led, in Madison's opinion, to the sacrifice of "private rights" and the exposure of judges to "all the corruptions of the two other departments." Instead, foreshadowing provisions for the new federal judiciary, Madison favored executive appointment, fixed salaries, and life tenure to shield judges from legislative intrigue and popular sentiment.

In another effort to resist, as Madison put it, "the maxim . . . that the interest of the majority is the political standard of right and wrong," many leaders sought to establish written constitutions, with their bills of rights, clear definitions of procedure, and careful limitations of power, as fundamental law, above legislative or executive authority. Massachusetts and other states elected special conventions to draft constitutions and then held special elections to ratify them to underscore the supremacy and the republican character of constitutional provisions. These solemn, deliberate acts of the people established a "higher law" that a majority of the legislature or even of the people would be forbidden to violate.

American political thought and experience after 1776 in fact highlighted a tension built into the Declaration of Independence which proclaimed in one clause that certain rights were "un-



alienable," and in another that "Governments . . . derive their just powers from the consent of the governed." Rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness were not to be submitted to a vote or to depend on the outcome of elections; that is, not even the consent of the governed could legitimately abridge them. But it was nonetheless possible that the people, through their elected representatives, might sanction laws violating "unalienable" rights. Suppose legislatures, state or national, passed laws abridging freedom of the press, or violating liberty of conscience, or permitting default on contracts, as happened in the 1780s. Which principle had priority, that of "consent" or that of "unalienable rights"? Unless it could be assured that all, or at least a majority, of the people would always protect "unalienable rights," which few thought likely, the American Revolutionists seemed committed to propositions not always compatible. The Federal Constitution of 1787 was one effort to contain the tension, and the debate over its ratification often revolved around whether the framers had properly adjusted the balance of the two principles. Virtually all the members of the Federal Convention, and both sides in the ratification struggle, sought to fulfill the purposes of the Declaration of Independence to both protect rights and insure government by consent. The key differences arose over which purpose to emphasize and what mechanisms of government best assured some fulfillment of each. The separation from Great Britain and eleven years of independent state and national government had left Americans with an uncertain national identity, an intriguing republican idealism, and an intricate array of unresolved tensions and practical problems.

### *Republicanism in the 1780s*

As the Federal Convention assembled in May 1787 its members did agree, though, on some basic principles and use of terms. All believed in government by consent, which in eighteenth-century understanding included (1) constitutional monarchy, where the monarch's powers were limited and where the government included an assembly elected by the people; (2) a



republic, meaning some form of representative government without a hereditary executive; and (3) democracy, which meant either town-meeting style democracy or simply the direct voice of the people within a government. The Revolutionary struggle against the government of George III left even constitutional monarchy in ill-repute in America. (Many leaders, however, including at times John Adams and Alexander Hamilton, continued to think it theoretically the form most likely to insure freedom and good government.) Equally discredited was "mere democracy" which still meant, as Aristotle had taught, rule by the passionate, ignorant, demagogue-dominated "voice of the people." This was sure to produce first injustice, then anarchy, and finally tyranny. Hence, virtually all shades of opinion reviled monarchy and democracy, and, publicly at least, affirmed republicanism. (This republicanism of the 1780s was not in principle different from what in Britain and America by mid-nineteenth century was generally called representative democracy. The founders would not have been opposed to the modern connotations of the word "democracy," nor would they have used the word "republic" to mark out a distinction from those connotations. In scorning "democracy," eighteenth-century theorists had in mind Aristotle's picture of a heedless, emotional, manipulated populace that would still be denigrated by most modern democratic theorists.)

By 1787, republicanism, then, was positioned between monarchy and "mere democracy." As it benefited from the experience of the years after 1776 and struggled to contain the tension between "unalienable rights" and majority rule, republicanism became both more moderate and more intricate. A broadly based lower house of a legislature continued to be basic to government by consent, but, increasingly, the election of other officials came to be regarded as good republican practice. Also, mindful of colonial experience and following the arguments of Montesquieu, the idea that the legislative, executive, and judicial powers had to be "separated," made to "check and balance" each other in order to prevent tyranny, gained wide acceptance. This often validated devices of government that would restrain or "refine" the will of the majority in order to protect rights, or "higher law."

Thus, while eighteenth-century American republicanism was committed to the sovereignty of the people, it was also a complicated approach to government. It opposed traditional, monarchical tyranny, but was equally hostile to mob rule. It also sought balancing and refining devices that would at once restrain the power of rulers, encourage the better judgment of the people, and enable the union to defend itself in a dangerous world. Edmund Burke stated the problem succinctly: "to make a government requires no great prudence; settle the seat of power, teach obedience, and the work is done. To give freedom is still more easy. It is not necessary to guide; it only requires to let go the rein. But to form a free government, that is, to temper together the opposite elements of liberty and restraint in one conscious work, requires much thought; deep reflection; a sagacious, powerful, and combining mind." Madison's formulation in *Federalist* No. 51 made the same point: "You must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place, oblige it to control itself"—as much a need in a republic as in any other form of government.

In a way, to oblige government to "control itself" was more difficult in the new United States than it was in Europe. There, "balance of power" theorists made use of the essentially different orders of traditional society—king, lords, commons, or first, second, and third estates—to achieve equilibrium in government. Thus British government preserved balanced freedom by giving each of the distinct—separately derived—orders of society a means of self-defense. The monarch, the House of Lords, and the House of Commons each had effective legislative voice. The balance was enduring because the king and the nobility and the commoners were formally and permanently separate. But in the United States, without a hereditary monarch or nobility, and without politically powerful bishops or other privileged elements formally distinct from "the people," how could checks and balances work? What real balance could there be when ultimately, as republican theory required, all legitimate power came from one entity, the people? Could the separation of powers among levels and branches of governments all resting on consent provide checks like those arising



from the distinct orders of a hierarchical society? Were, then, the ideas of deriving all just power from the consent of the governed, and genuine balance of powers, mutually exclusive? Yet another complicated problem faced the framers and ratifiers of 1787–1788.

The response, drawn in part from the ideas of David Hume but best elaborated by James Madison, was to try to build into the mechanism of government itself enough variations on election, powers, term of office, and complication of function to *create* separate interests and perspectives. Thus, for example, even though an upper and a lower house of the legislature might each *eventually* derive from the people, different districts, different terms of office, different modes of election, and different definitions of authority would create balances of power. Complex arrangements for appointing and giving power to other officials, and “refinements” of popular will through devices like an electoral college, it was theorized, would become further effective substitutes for the balances inherent in the lasting divisions within traditional societies. Could mere complication of government, together with devices to “refine” the expression of majority will, without departing fundamentally from the principle of consent, protect basic rights both from potential tyrants within government and from popular passions? The intention was to temper idealism with realism, and to substitute complexity for balance of orders. The challenge offered wide scope for political theorists as well as practical strategists as the time approached to revise the Federal Constitution.

### *Political Currents of the 1780s*

These difficult and important theoretical problems existed at the Federal Convention amid a welter of clashing interests, social distinctions, ethnic diversities, religious backgrounds, and disparities of wealth. Differences over geography, commerce, religion, customs, land speculation, slavery, and credit influenced proposals for structures of government and sometimes required compromise of principle as well as of interests. These



concerns, especially that of the New England states to regulate commerce by majority vote in Congress, and of Georgia and South Carolina to keep open the slave trade (settled by compromise; see pp. 153–58), had an impact on many decisions. The Constitution also gave implicit sanction to private property (including slaves) and otherwise sustained the planter-yeoman/farmer/mercantile society that had emerged in the thirteen newly independent states. Yet, the Constitution as drafted also reflects the ebb and flow of debate over principles of government. In fact, there are some signs that the various special interests represented at the Convention counteracted and often nullified each other and thus in a way gave scope to discussion of basic constitutional issues. There is little evidence, in any case, that determined factions—creditors, land speculators, merchants, slave owners, or any others—implanted in the draft constitution a self-interested mode of government inconsistent with republican principles.

The principle of consent, furthermore, since it was thought of largely as applying to those with a material stake in society (land, securities, slaves, mercantile property, tax payments, etc.), was less inclusive in the eighteenth century than it would become two hundred years later. Property qualifications for voting and office-holding were common, and women were barred from doing either. Most extreme, black slaves were not regarded as part of the political community and hence were entirely denied participation and protection of rights. Though some advanced thinkers saw the inconsistencies in these limitations (especially of slave owners and slave traders proclaiming the blessings of liberty) and cried out against them, sentiment in 1787 had not generally reached the point where universal suffrage would be on the agenda of constitution framers. Thus the Convention ignored those issues by accepting the guidelines already existing in state constitutions and in the Articles of Confederation. Though this did not advance the causes of enlarged suffrage and abolition of slavery, at the same time, deliberately, there were no explicit barriers in the Constitution to liberalization when sentiment within any state moved in that direction. States were able to abolish slavery, and voting for members of

the lower house in Congress was to carry the same limitations—or lack of limitation—as for the lower house of the state legislature. The Convention had to find mechanisms of government that would guarantee the power of the people to decide economic as well as other matters, and protect the “unalienable rights” gained by the Revolution.

These theoretical and practical concerns persisted as the new nation struggled to survive, first in war and then in peace. As the states drafted and revised their constitutions, they also worked to form a confederal constitution. The *ad hoc* actions of the Continental Congresses, setting aside British authority and fighting the Revolutionary War, had to be formalized and a permanent form of government established. Congress approved “Articles of Confederation” in 1777 that were finally ratified (by all the states) and became the basis for national government in 1781. They were the first American constitution. Almost at once, though, complaints arose about their weakness and inefficiency. “Nationalists” such as Robert Morris, Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, James Wilson, and George Washington agreed that the Articles were inadequate and made various proposals for strengthening them. They sought especially to give Congress wider taxing power, more control over interstate and foreign commerce, and power to compel state compliance with acts of Congress. Since the Articles required unanimous consent of the states for amendment, proposals for change were easily blocked. A conference at Mount Vernon in 1785, though, which settled navigation, boundary, and other disputes between Maryland and Virginia, encouraged the idea of a larger meeting to cope with problems apparently stymied in Congress under the Articles. A convention at Annapolis in September 1786, asking all the states to discuss interstate commerce regulation, failed because most states did not send delegates. It did, however, call for another convention to meet in May 1787 in Philadelphia. A heightened sense of futility in Congress and disarray in the nation (Shays’ rebellion flared that winter) led Congress and all states except Rhode Island to endorse that call. Hence, the fifty-five delegates who came to the Federal Convention of 1787 (others appointed did not come at all) had in mind generally to strengthen the Articles,



but beyond that there was little agreement on how extensively and in what way to do that.

### *The Federal Convention of 1787*

The debates of the Convention, known to us largely through notes taken by James Madison during its deliberations, flowed through readily discernible stages. The largely favorable reception by the Convention of the "Virginia Plan" (see pp. 7-12), conceived by Madison and agreed to by the Virginia delegation, implied that the Convention intended to frame a new government rather than merely amend the Articles of Confederation, as most delegates had been instructed to do. For two weeks the delegates debated representation, executive powers, state-national relations, and other basic matters. Though the Convention voted down the clause in the Virginia Plan giving Congress the power to "negative" "improper" state laws, in general there was surprising support for provisions to strengthen the national government. On June 13 the Convention accepted nineteen resolves largely following the Virginia Plan. The "small state" forces, however, still opposed bitterly the tentative switch from an equal vote for each state in the national legislature (as under the Articles of Confederation) to representation according to the population.

The Convention entered a new phase on June 15 when William Paterson introduced what became known as the "New Jersey Plan" (see pp. 39-48), retaining the equality of the states and other provisions closer to the Articles. The challenge had been made, and for a month the delegates debated state equality with increased passion and rancor, sought compromises, and struggled to prevent disruption of the Convention. Madison, James Wilson, Rufus King, and other proponents of proportional representation stood firm. Paterson, Luther Martin of Maryland, and other small-state delegates insisted just as strongly on state equality, while the Convention conciliators, mainly Benjamin Franklin and William Samuel Johnson of Connecticut, suggested compromise. A grand committee, appointed to settle the



deadlocked issue, reported on July 5 recommending the so-called "Great Compromise." The lower house would have representation according to population, and the states would be equal in the upper house. Though Madison and Wilson opposed the compromise because to them it violated the vital republican principle of majority rule, most of the delegates were ready to accept an accommodation. On July 16, the Convention approved the "Great Compromise."

Having settled this major point, the Convention considered, in ten days of important debate, the powers and election of the executive, the judiciary, the method of ratification, and the powers of Congress. After making some tentative decisions and deferring others, on July 26 the Convention appointed a committee of detail to arrange and systemize what had been done so far and to make proposals on unsettled matters. Its report (see pp. 122–134), made on August 6, was the first document before the Convention to resemble the final constitution. Perhaps most notable, instead of the broad power in the Virginia Plan for Congress "to legislate in all cases to which the separate States are incompetent," the draft enumerated the powers of Congress. Madison and other advocates of broad national power came to favor a more careful definition of congressional power after the adoption of what they regarded as the flawed "Great Compromise." They were unwilling to so generally empower a body where a few states containing a small minority of the population could have a deciding voice. Small-state delegates, on the other hand, assured of an equal voice in the Senate, became increasingly willing to put power in the hands of the central government, a circumstance that led in time to the quick ratification of the Constitution by most of the small states.

For more than a month, August 7–September 10, the Convention debated, clause-by-clause, the articles of the draft constitution. As the delegates thus settled matters of detail and accepted the practical compromise between New England and the deep South states on slavery and commercial regulation (see pp. 153–58), they continued to dispute the powers of the executive department and its relation to the Senate. How to elect the executive, how he might exercise his veto, and how he might be

joined with the Senate in appointive and treaty-making powers, continued to vex and divide the delegates. By September 10, after several referrals of unsettled matters to select committees, the Convention felt it had sufficiently resolved all questions to entrust its work to a committee on arrangement and style. The actual draft of the final document seems to have been executed by Gouverneur Morris.

As the Constitution took final shape, however, it was apparent that three delegates still at the Convention, Edmund Randolph and George Mason of Virginia and Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts, did not approve it. Before and after the committee on arrangement and style did its work, they complained about many particulars, but mainly opposed the scope of powers given to the new federal government. (Their objections, reprinted on pp. 166–71, in fact anticipated many of the arguments anti-federalists would offer in the ratification debates.) Nonetheless thirty-nine delegates approved their work, and after a few changes in detail, moved, with the unanimous consent of all states present, to submit the constitution to the Confederation Congress and to the people of the states.

### *The Ratification Contest*

The ratification struggle began with a clever move by the proponents of the new constitution: since sentiment in the country was hostile to the idea of a national government and preferred a confederation, or federation (the words were synonymous in the eighteenth century), the proponents called themselves "federalists" even though the new document was not, strictly speaking, a federation, a league of governments, as the old Articles were. In fact, the new constitution, as Madison explained carefully in *Federalist* No. 39, was a "composite," partly national in that some powers impinged directly on the people (most notably the taxing power and the election of the House of Representatives) and partly federal in that the states acted as "units" of the central government (most notably in the election of the Senate). By taking the popular word "federal" to denote



the new constitution, its backers gained an important "image" victory for themselves. The word "federal" came eventually to mean the form of government embodied in the new Constitution, just as "confederation" came to mean the more strictly "league of states" idea of the Articles of Confederation and eventually the "Confederacy" of 1861–1865. The foes of ratification, moreover, were left with the negative designation, "anti-federalists." (The term "federalist" here, uncapitalized, refers to the proponents of the new constitution, 1787–1789, and is a different group from the political party formed in the 1790s, called "Federalist," usually capitalized.)

Important backers of the new constitution, most notably Alexander Hamilton and James Madison, returned to New York (where the Articles of Confederation Congress was in session) to organize their campaign for ratification. With Hamilton taking the initiative, he, Madison, and John Jay agreed to write a series of essays for New York newspapers explaining and defending the new Constitution. They used the pseudonym "Publius," the legendary law-giver of the Roman republic extolled by Plutarch, in addressing "the People of the State of New York." Jay's illness during the winter of 1787–1788 limited his contribution to only five of the eighty-five essays. Hamilton wrote fifty-one and Madison twenty-nine (the long dispute over authorship of some essays is now settled; Madison wrote all the essays he designated as his in old age). Anxious to get the systematic argument for the new Constitution before the public, Hamilton and Madison hurried three or four essays a week to the newspapers between October 27, 1787, and April 2, 1788. In general, Hamilton wrote the essays on the need for a more energetic government, on the powers of Congress, and on the executive and judicial departments, while Madison explained the nature of the federal system, the formal and informal checks and balances, and the House of Representatives and the Senate. At the time, however, readers did not know who "Publius" was, and saw the *Federalist* as a comprehensive, single-minded advocacy of the Constitution. At the same time other federalist essays and speeches appeared in the newspapers, and the major anti-federalist series of essays, "Centinel," "Cato," "Brutus," and "The Federal Farmer," came out

initially in Philadelphia and New York newspapers, and were soon reprinted throughout the country.

As the theoretical arguments developed before the public, separate ratification struggles took place in each state. Reflecting satisfaction over the state equality in the Senate, and anxious for protection within a stronger union, conventions in three small states, Delaware, New Jersey, and Georgia, ratified early and unanimously. Connecticut was also strongly federalist and ratified readily (128-40), while the vagaries of Pennsylvania politics, plus the zeal of James Wilson and other federalists, produced an early federalist victory (46-23) there, too. Thus, when the closely divided Massachusetts convention met in January 1788, five states had already ratified. After a long, spirited debate, and some clever maneuvering by the federalists, the Massachusetts convention voted on February 16, 1787, 187-168, to ratify.

This close vote, and the strength of the anti-federalists in the critical states of Virginia and New York, created an air of uncertainty during the first six months of 1788. The eventual, easy ratifications by Maryland (63-11) and South Carolina (149-73) in April and May cheered the federalists; only one more state would need to ratify to implement the new government. Yet, awareness that anti-federalists were dominant in New Hampshire, that Rhode Island and North Carolina were hostile, and that the vital states of Virginia and New York might not ratify, left the issue in balance as the Virginia convention assembled in June. There, in the most important of the ratification contests, Madison, Randolph, and other federalists achieved a debating victory over George Mason, Patrick Henry, and their anti-federal allies. Virginia voted to ratify, 89-79, on June 25, and in the meantime New Hampshire had enough shifted its position to ratify, 57-47, on June 21. With ten states having ratified, establishment of the new government was certain. Faced with this circumstance, the New York convention, though its delegates were elected largely as anti-federalists (46-19), nonetheless after thorough debate voted to ratify, 30-27. The North Carolina convention voted against ratification, 193-75, while Rhode Island refused even to call a convention. North Carolina ratified



the constitution and joined the union in November 1789, and Rhode Island did so in May 1790.

### *Federalist Principles*

As this political struggle progressed, crucial theoretical differences clarified. The federalists on the whole saw and sought the benefits more effective, energetic government could bring even, perhaps especially, in a republic (see Federalist Nos. 1, 23). Well aware of the tendency of confederations and small, vulnerable republics to be merely provincial, to quarrel among themselves, and to be gobbled up by more united, powerful nations (see Nos. 18–20), the federalists sought the stability and strength that could come from union and from steady, effective government. As James Wilson saw with particular clarity, strong government could as much serve the people when controlled by them as it could injure them when it was hostile to them. Therefore, the need to limit the powers of government so important during the long struggle to end the tyranny of kings was perhaps misguided when the government was not alien or from above, but *of the people* (see No. 70). The goal, then, was not simply the *limitation* of the powers of the executive, or even of the government as a whole, but the insurance of its faithfulness to the people and of the stability and wisdom of its enactments. To Hamilton, Madison, and other federalists, government in the United States, even though more fully republican than any other in the world, had also often been weak, unstable, and foolish. Foreign intrigue, domestic insurrection, bankruptcy, and dismemberment all threatened the new nation, and, in the opinion of the federalists, could only be avoided by a stronger union (see Nos. 2–8).

Despite this sharp critique, the federalists still thought of themselves as heirs to the American Revolution and sincere friends of government by consent. To them the ideals of human rights and rule by the people required not suspicion of government but *use* of it. They were confident that human ingenuity could devise mechanisms that would at once protect liberty, al-

low effective government, and rest on the consent of the people (see Nos. 10, 37). It was possible both to give sufficient powers to the House of Representatives and to the president, and to guard against the abuse of those powers. It was only prudent to erect barriers against tendencies toward greed, passion, and selfish ambition in any human government, but it was also important to benefit from wise and good rule (see Nos. 51, 78). If good government was impossible when "the people" chose their own rulers, then the very idea of government by consent stood condemned (see No. 57). The federalists believed the new Constitution provided effective resolution of these intricacies.

They also had high hopes that with the stability and energy of the new Constitution the nation might expand and progress rapidly. The federalists sought agricultural and commercial growth that would bring wealth and prosperity to all the people, and they saw the national government as a guide and partner in the westward expansion of the nation (see No. 14). They also supposed that the nation needed vigor and power in order to survive and exert its influence in the dangerous but opportunity-laden international scene. In short, the federalists sought English-style commercial growth, domestic prosperity, and world power, which they thought were compatible with Revolutionary ideals of freedom and self-government. They believed the new Constitution furnished the means for achieving those goals.

### *Anti-federalist Political Thought*

Perceiving these aspirations and purposes, the anti-federalists were at once skeptical and disheartened. They saw in federalist hopes for commercial growth and international prestige only the lust of ambitious men for a "splendid empire" where, in the time-honored way, the people would be burdened with taxes, conscription, and campaigns (see Patrick Henry and "John DeWitt"). Uncertain that any government over so vast a domain as the United States could be controlled by the people, the anti-federalists saw in the enlarged powers of the central government only the familiar threats to the rights and liberties of the people.



The federal judiciary, for example, seemed like simply another magistracy removed from the people that would enforce harsh and arbitrary laws (see "Brutus," Nos. 11, 12, 15). The broad power to lay and collect taxes, the president's role as commander-in-chief, Congress' authority to pass any laws "necessary and proper" to carry out its enumerated powers, and the "supreme law" and treaty-making powers, all seemed unbounded and at least potentially tyrannical. A persistent thrust in anti-federal thought, then, was both to withdraw some of the explicit powers given to the national government and to restrain with further checks and balances the exercise of its remaining powers. The anti-federalists were, in a sense, "men of little faith" as both contemporary and modern critics have charged, but this was true only within their fear that centralized power tended to become arbitrary and impersonal. The anti-federalists came to these views more readily, of course, because the Whig rhetoric of eighteenth-century British radicalism and the ideology of the American Revolution were filled with suspicions of power, especially distant, centralized power. These arguments were now handy for use against other advocates of such power.

The anti-federalists also had a positive idealism of their own, a republican vision they thought far closer to the purpose of the American Revolution than the political and commercial ambitions of the federalists. The anti-federalists looked to the Classical idealization of the small, pastoral republic where virtuous, self-reliant citizens managed their own affairs and shunned the power and glory of empire. To them, the victory in the American Revolution meant not so much the big chance to become a wealthy world power, but rather the opportunity to achieve a genuinely republican polity, far from the greed, lust for power, and tyranny that had generally characterized human society. Was it possible, they asked themselves, to found society on other bases and with other aspirations that would nourish the virtue and happiness of all the people? Could they break the self-fulfilling cycle where selfish people needed to be controlled by checks and balances which in turn required and encouraged more and more self-seeking by the people?

To the anti-federalists this meant retaining as much as possi-

ble the vitality of local government where rulers and ruled could see, know, and understand each other. Thus they cherished the Revolutionary emphasis on state and local councils and committees, and the Articles of Confederation where the central government rested entirely on the states. The idea of self-government was tied inextricably to something like a town meeting directness or at least to a state legislature of many annually elected representatives who would really know the people of their districts. Each "district," furthermore, would be a town or ward or region conscious of its own particular identity rather than being some amorphous, arbitrary geographic entity (see "John DeWitt"). Only with such intimacy could the trust, goodwill, and deliberation essential to wise and virtuous public life be a reality. Anything else, even though resting in some fashion on the consent of the people, would not really be self-government.

The intense anti-federalist suspicions of corruption, greed, and lust for power were directed generally at those who ruled from on high and without restraint. Corruption and tyranny would be rampant as they always had been when those who exercised power felt little connection with the people. This would be true, moreover, for elected representatives, as well as for kings and nobles and bishops, who lived in a distant capital milieu where power, intrigue, and wealth exerted their baneful influence. The more remote and distantly powerful a government was, the more visions of imperial Rome or Versailles or London came to mind with all their venality, cynicism, corruption, and neglect of the people (see "Cato"). Would some future capital of the United States be as filled with courtiers, courtesans, military heroes, and superfluous officeholders as London or Paris or St. Petersburg? The anti-federalists thought so under a constitution that consolidated power in a central government remote from the people.

On the other hand, legends of the Greek and Roman republics, the maturing ideology of natural rights, and the substantial experience of local self-government in the New World seemed to offer a far more alluring prospect. *If* the basic decency in human nature, most evident among ordinary people at the local level amid family, church, school, and other nourishing institu-



tions, could impinge directly and continuously on government, then perhaps it too might be kept virtuous and worthy of confidence. Then, instead of endless suspicion of and guarding against the evil and corruption of government, it might be possible to trust it and use it for the public benefit. The result might even be a society where honest, hardworking people could enjoy the fruits of their labor, where institutions encouraged and rested on virtue rather than greed, where officials were servants of the people rather than oppressors, and where peace and prosperity came from vigilant self-confidence rather than from conquest and dominion (see Patrick Henry). Anti-federalists saw mild, grassroots, small-scale governments in sharp contrast to the splendid edifice and overweening ambition implicit in the new Constitution—and, indeed, heralded by Publius and its other proponents. The first left citizens free to live their own lives and to cultivate the virtue (private and public) vital to republicanism, while the second soon entailed taxes and drafts and offices and wars damaging to human dignity and thus fatal to self-government.

The anti-federalist ideal emerged most clearly and practically in its understanding of what representation and government by consent could really mean. Instead of seeking to insulate officials from popular influence, as, for example, Publius argued federal judges should be (Federalist No. 78), anti-federalists sought to insure the public good by requiring close association. If legislators, for example, rather than federal judges appointed for life, had the power to interpret the Constitution, they would do so "at their peril"; if the people disapproved the interpretation, they "could remove them" ("Brutus," No. 15). The ideal went beyond a close control of officials by the people. In a truly self-governing society, there would be such dialogue, empathy, and even intimacy that the very distinction between ruler and ruled would tend to disappear. Such a close link between the people and officials would embody the idea of liberty being both security of rights and effective voice in public affairs. The anti-federalists groped for mechanisms that would give reality to this idea: how could it be achieved, in substance as well as in form, in a large nation?

For anti-federalists the bonds between the people and their representatives had to be trustworthy as well as close. Not only, as Melancton Smith put it, should "representatives resemble those they represent," but they should possess especially the virtues most characteristic of ordinary people: they should be temperate, moral, and of restrained ambition. Smith acknowledged that "the same passions and prejudices govern all men," but it was also true that "circumstances . . . give a cast to human character." The wealthy and the powerful, sad to say, were inclined to cheat customers, disdain honest labor, raise armies, put on social airs, and oppress the people. Could they be expected to rule wisely and justly in the interests of all? Rather, it was necessary that people of the "middling sort," average people, perhaps yeoman farmers, themselves take part in government—even be elected to office in large enough numbers to "set the tone" in the capital. Such people, in the daily round of their occupations, Smith observed, had "less temptations, [and] are inclined by habit, and by the company with whom they associate, to set bounds to their passions and appetites." He envisioned, then, a government of popular confidence and respect, vital at the local levels where the virtues of ordinary people could prevail. Though Smith articulated this more forthrightly than most anti-federalists, many others expressed the ideal implicitly (see "John DeWitt," Patrick Henry, and "the Federal Farmer"), and it was consistent with a moral and civic tradition long familiar in the Western world.

This was idealistic, of course, but the anti-federalists thought the goal of the American Revolution was to end the ancient equation of power where arrogant, oppressive, and depraved rulers on one side produced subservience and a gradual erosion of the self-respect, capacities, and virtue of the people on the other side. The result was an increasing corruption and degeneracy in both rulers and ruled. Unless this cycle could be broken, Independence would mean little more than the exchange of one tyranny for another. The aspirations of the federalists for commercial growth, westward expansion, increased national power, and effective world diplomacy were in some ways attractive and worthy, but they also fitted an ominous, all too familiar pattern of



“great, splendid, . . . consolidated government” and “Universal Empire” that the American Revolution had been fought to eradicate. Many anti-federalists, inchoately perhaps, were unwilling to abandon this ideal and the hope that the New World might be a different and better place to live.

The ratification contest, then, was at bottom a debate over the future of the nation. Beneath the disputes about detailed clauses were deep differences over what fulfillment of the American Revolution meant. To the federalists, it meant independence, growth in national power, and prosperity, all within a federal system of government retaining the states and deriving its authority from the people, but also competent to all the needs and exigencies of respectable, energetic nationhood. This was an attractive purpose for large numbers of people of all classes and was in their view a legitimate outgrowth of the Revolution. The anti-federalists, on the other hand, sought a society where virtuous, hardworking honest men and women lived simply in their own communities, enjoyed their families and their neighbors, were devoted to the common welfare, and had such churches, schools, trade associations, and local governments as they needed to sustain their values and purposes. Though this intention was seldom fully or clearly articulated, it permeates anti-federalist writing enough to reveal what their positive ideal was. The quick adoption of the Bill of Rights, the ready acceptance of the new constitution by former anti-federalists, and the Jeffersonian triumph of 1801 with its manifold anti-federalist overtones, all attest to the vigor and influence of anti-federalism and its ability to find fulfillment even under the document opposed so vehemently in 1787–1788. Anti-federal ideas have also surfaced again and again in various guises among later generations of Americans. Those ideas, as well as the enticing prospects held out by Publius, are a vital element in the American political tradition and are properly viewed as part of the philosophy of the Constitution.

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